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The Problem of Indirect Defamation:
Omission of Material Facts, Implication,
and Innuendo
David M. Cohnt
The Washington Post reports that Bob Hoffman, a weight-
lifting coach, sold valueless protein supplements called "Hoffman's
High Protein Tablets."' The article also reports that Hoffman
drives a Rolls Royce and that many of his athletes were later dis-
covered to be using anabolic steroids.2 Hoffman sues the Washing-
ton Post, claiming that the article falsely implied that he enriched
himself by selling the protein substitutes.' The newspaper defends
by claiming that the statements taken individually are true and
thus not defamatory.' Should Hoffman recover damages?
Traditionally, the law of defamation has recognized truth as a
complete defense. Indirect defamation' cases, however, blur the
line between truth and falsehood. A factually correct article may
omit or falsely imply a material fact that makes the article just as
harmful as a blatantly false report. Courts have continually strug-
gled with this problem without reaching a consensus. This Com-
ment examines the current law of indirect defamation and suggests
a model standard to govern these cases.
The model standard proposed in this Comment attempts to
address the concerns that make indirect defamation cases difficult.
The press cannot guard as easily against false implications" and
t B.Ar.Sc. 1991, University of South Carolina; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of
Chicago.
Hoffman v Washington Post Co., 433 F Supp 600, 602 (D DC 1977), aff'd, 578 F2d
442 (DC Cir 1978).
3 Id.
3 Id.
Id at 602-03.
In this Comment, indirect defamation is defined as those statements whose defama-
tory nature arises from omissions, implications, or innuendo. In contrast, direct defamation
consists of those statements whose defamatory nature arises solely from the plain meaning
of the words.
0 In this Comment, implication is defined as "intendment or inference, as distinguished
from the actual expression of a thing in words." Black's Law Dictionary 754 (West Publish-
ing Co., 6th ed 1990). Similarly, innuendo consists of "indirect or subtle implication in
words or expression, usually derogatory." Id at 789.
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material omissions 7 as it can against false statements of fact. Thus,
the model standard requires that plaintiffs both negate the sub-
stantial truth of the publication in implication cases and prove
that an omitted fact caused an actual defamatory implication in
omission cases. Furthermore, the model standard, in order to af-
ford the media adequate protection, provides for enhanced scienter
requirements; the standard recognizes that because the media can-
not easily guard against omissions or implications, the plaintiff
should be required to show a heightened level of press irresponsi-
bility. Thus, the model standard requires an intent to deceive or
omit facts in public figure suits and reckless implication or omis-
sion in suits by private plaintiffs.
Part I of this Comment explores the similarities between indi-
rect defamation and the common law tort of libel per quod. Part II
investigates the courts' common law response to indirect defama-
tion claims by examining both British cases and pre-New York
Times Co. v Sullivan' American cases. Part II also discusses the
current state of indirect defamation law; in particular, it addresses
New York Times and the constitutionalization of defamation law,
as well as specific state and lower federal court treatments of indi-
rect defamation cases. Part III evaluates the more recent cases and
suggests a model standard under which courts should address indi-
rect defamation cases."
I. INDIRECT DEFAMATION AND LIBEL PER QUOD
The distinction between direct and indirect defamation is sim-
ilar to that between libel per se and libel per quod. Because the
damaging effect of libel per quod is likely to be less severe than the
harm caused by libel per se, many states have held that libel per
quod is actionable only with proof of damage. If a plaintiff fails to
plead special or actual damages, an action for libel per quod can-
not be maintained.' 0
In this Comment, the term "omission" means the omission of material fact(s) causing
an otherwise non-defamatory statement to become defamatory.
8 376 US 254 (1964).
9 This Comment devotes itself to a discussion of indirect defamation law in cases in-
volving media defendants, defined as news reporting organizations, such as newspapers or
television stations, that are defendants in defamation actions. Neither the discussion nor the
model standard is intended to apply to defamation cases brought against non-media
defendants.
10 William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 Va L Rev 839, 841 (1960). However, proof of
damage was not required for libel per quod when the publication fell into one of four cate-
[1993:
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Ellsworth v Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory1 illustrates
the courts' treatment of libel per quod claims. In Ellsworth, the
plaintiff brought a defamation claim based on an attorney rating
published in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. The defamation
could not be established, however, without reference to a confiden-
tial key interpreting the. rating.12 Thus, the alleged libel was not
apparent based on the publication alone.'8 Because the plaintiff
did not plead special damages, the case was dismissed."'
For many years, American common law followed the British
approach and did not distinguish between libel per se and libel per
quod. 1' In the late nineteenth century, however, American courts
modified that approach and began to distinguish between the two
actions. 6 Libel per se includes statements whose defamatory na-
ture is "apparent upon the face of the publication itself, so that it
is conveyed to any reader entirely ignorant of the facts, without
resort to any other source.' 7 Such libel is actionable without proof
of special or actual damages. Libel per quod, in contrast, depends
on the existence of extrinsic facts that are known to the reader but
not mentioned in the publication. 8 Because libel per quod de-
pends on the audience's knowledge of extrinsic facts, its damaging
effect is likely to be smaller than that of libel per se because only a
select number of readers will understand the defamatory nature of
the libelous statement.
This two-tiered special damages system of libel per se and li-
bel per quod has recently fallen into disfavor. 9 Indeed, the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts has endorsed the British common law
position that all libel is actionable without proof of special or ac-
tual damages.2 0 Thus, the critical underlying distinction between
libel per se and libel per quod has been eliminated. Although New
gories: imputation of crime, loathsome disease, defamation affecting business, or unchastity
on the part of a woman. Id.
66 ND 578, 268 NW 400 (1936).
268 NW at 401.
- See William L. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv L Rev 1629, 1643 (1966). See
also Macri v Mayer, 22 Misc 2d 429, 201 NYS2d 525 (Sup Ct 1964) (article stated that
someone other than the plaintiff had authored the advertising slogan, although plaintiff had
stated to others that she authored the slogan).
14 268 NW at 407.
Prosser, 46 Va L Rev at 843 (cited in note 10).
1' Id at 843-44.
17 Id at 839-40.
18 Id at 840.
1' See Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts ch 16 at 1098 (Little, Brown
& Co., 5th ed 1990).
1* Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569, comment b at 183 (1977).
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York Times and Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.21 have transformed
libel into a matter of federal constitutional law, the problem of in-
direct defamation may provide the states with the opportunity to
reexamine the need for a bifurcated system of defamation law.
Indirect defamation and libel per quod are similar but not
identical. In both types of cases, the defamation arises from the
context in which the communication was made. Unlike indirect
defamation, however, libel per quod may encompass blatantly false
assertions.2 For example, in Solotaire v Cowles Magazines, Inc.,25
the defendant published an article stating that the plaintiff's hus-
band was a bachelor. In fact, the plaintiff and her husband had
been married for twenty-two years. The plaintiff alleged that this
error constituted libel because it implied "unchaste and indecent
cohabitation."24 Although the article stated a falsehood, the arti-
cle's defamatory implication depended upon the reader's know-
ledge that the plaintiff and her husband in fact lived together. In
contrast, indirect defamation only involves cases in which the chal-
lenged communication relays the truth. Nevertheless, similarities
between libel per quod and indirect defamation remain. Libel per
quod depends on the reader's knowledge of extrinsic facts. Like-
wise, indirect defamation depends on the reader's assumption of
facts that are not explicitly stated. In either case, the publication
in and of itself is not defamatory; rather, the defamation arises
from the context of the publication.
II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
A. Indirect Defamation and the Common Law
Special standards for indirect defamation are relatively new
and uniquely American. Before New York Times, American courts
decided such cases similarly to British common law courts. Early
American and current British defamation law suggest that the new,
bifurcated American approach may be unnecessary.
Before New York Times, courts treated indirect and direct
defamation cases similarly. 5 Most courts adopted some variant of
2' 418 US 323 (1974).
" Libel per quod arises from the defamatory nature of the implication or inference
drawn from the false statement. A statement that is libelous per quod may conceivably be
libelous per se as well.
107 NYS2d 798 (Sup Ct 1951).
24 Id at 799.
28 At common law, courts presumed that alleged defamation was false. See Harrison v
Winchell, 207 Misc 275, 137 NYS 82 (Sup Ct 1955). Thus, a defendant had to plead truth as
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the "reasonable interpretation" test still used by British common
law courts.2 6 The courts determined the meaning of ambiguous
language, innuendo, and implications by objective tests based on
reader perception. For example, in Carwile v Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc.,2 7 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that "the meaning
of the alleged defamatory language cannot, by innuendo, be ex-
tended beyond its ordinary and common accept[ance]."2 s Likewise,
in Richwine v Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., Inc.,9 a Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court stated that it would allow a defamation ac-
tion if "[t]he meaning of a communication is that which the recipi-
ent correctly or mistakenly but reasonably understands that it was
intended to express. ' 's Thus, at common law, the defamatory na-
ture of a statement depended on an objective test based on reason-
ableness and ordinary meaning."'
B. Libel and the Constitution
At common law, libel was a strict liability tort.3 In New York
Times, the Supreme Court eradicated this common law rule. The
an affirmative defense. The defendant was required to prove the truth of the communica-
tion's "reasonable" or "natural and ordinary" meaning rather than the substantial truth of
the individual statements.
"o The British test is "whether, under the circumstances in which the writing was pub-
lished, reasonable men to whom the publication was made would be likely to understand it
in a libellous sense." Lewis v Daily Telegraph, Ltd., 2 All ER 151, 154 (House of Lords
1963), quoting Capital and Counties Bank v George Henty & Sons, 7 App Cas 741, 745
(1882) (Lord Selborne).
196 Va 1, 82 SE2d 588 (1954).
, 82 SE2d at 592. See also Longey v Slator, 118 Vt 251, 108 A2d 396, 399 (1954);
Southeastern Newspapers, Inc. v Walker, 76 Ga App 57, 44 SE2d 697, 700 (1947); Thomp-
son v Osawatomie Publishing Co., 159 Kan 562, 156 P2d 506, 508 (1945); Gough v Tribune-
Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 275 P2d 663, 666 (1954); MacLeod v Tribune Publishing Co., 133
Cal App 2d 486, 343 P2d 36, 42 (1959).
186 Pa Super 644, 142 A2d 416 (1958).
30 142 A2d at 417, quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 563 (1938).
A minority of American courts departed from the ordinary meaning approach. Some
pre-New York Times courts treated indirect defamation like libel per quod. In Brodsky v
Journal Publishing Co., 73 SD 343, 42 NW2d 855 (1950), the court required that a plaintiff
plead additional facts to explain the defamatory nature of the statement in an action for
libel by innuendo. 42 NW2d at 857. In addition, even prior to the emergence of libel per
quod, some courts drew a distinction between innuendo and direct libel. For example, Mc-
Laughlin v Russell, 17 Ohio 475 (1848), allowed examination of witnesses with knowledge of
the circumstances to clarify an ambiguous, allegedly defamatory statement. Id at 480-81.
Similarly, the court in Van Derveer v Sutphin, 5 Ohio St 294 (1855), allowed the defendant
to plead partial truth or honest belief as mitigating factors. Id at 302. McLaughlin and Van
Derveer demonstrate that courts afforded defendants extra protection, including mitigation
and explanatory testimony, when they were unsure of a statement's defamatory nature.
" See Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts ch 16 at 1100 (cited in note 19).
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Court, reasoning that the First Amendment was. designed to "as-
sure [an] unfettered exchange of ideas," 3 ruled that a public offi-
cial may not recover for defamation relating to his official duties
without showing "actual malice" on the part of the defendant.3
The Court held that to recover, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant made the statement with "knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."38 The Su-
preme Court expanded New York Times in Gertz v Robert Welch,
Inc.,6 by requiring that private persons 87 show fault in order to re-
cover for defamation.38 In cases involving matters of public con-
cern, private plaintiffs must show fault to collect actual damages
and actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages.3 9 Be-
cause private persons have not voluntarily subjected themselves to
public scrutiny, they retain a greater interest in the sanctity of
their reputations.'0 Speech of public concern, however, deserves
broad First Amendment protection. Thus, the Gertz Court rea-
soned that defamation actions by private persons involving matters
of public concern merit an intermediate standard.'1
To further "ensure that true speech on matters of public con-
cern is not deterred," the Supreme Court, in Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v Hepps,42 placed the burden of proving falsity on pri-
vate figure plaintiffs.'3  Hepps completed the transition of
defamation law from common law to constitutional law. Hepps
and New York Times reasoned that the First Amendment guaran-
tees free discussion of matters of public concern. Under this stan-
dard, media defendants are immune from defamation suits unless
they print reckless falsehoods (for public figure plaintiffs) or negli-
gent non-truths (for private plaintiffs).
" New York Times, 376 US at 269, quoting Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484
(1957).
', Id at 279-80.
88 Id at 280.
86 418 US at 323.
11 A private figure is neither a public official (for example, a holder of public office) nor
a public figure (for example, an entertainer who has placed himself in the public limelight).
See id at 332.
" Id at 346. Private persons in cases not involving matters of public concern may col-
lect presumed and punitive damages without showing actual malice. See Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 US 749, 761 (1985).
Gertz, 418 US at 347-49.
40 Id at 345.
Id at 347.
475 US 767 (1986).
" Id at 776-77. The common law presumed all alleged libel to be false. The defendant
bore the burden of pleading and proving the truth of the statement.
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Indirect defamation exposes a possible flaw in the constitu-
tional standard. New York Times, Gertz, and Hepps all fail to con-
sider the scenario in which a media defendant prints only true
statements but nonetheless defames the plaintiff by omitting ma-
terial facts or implying unstated occurrences. Under a strict appli-
cation of the Times-Gertz-Hepps analysis, such statements cannot
be actionable. Indirect defamation claims arise out of true reports,
making the Hepps falsity requirement seemingly impossible to
meet. But omissions can, in some instances, pose concerns as seri-
ous as outright lies.
In Milkovich v Lorain Journal," the Supreme Court modified
the opinion privilege created by Gertz.'5 Chief Justice Rehnquist
announced the new standard that only "a statement of opinion re-
lating to matters of public concern which does not contain a prov-
ably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional pro-
tection. 40  The difference between Gertz and Milkovich is
dramatic. For example, the statement, "I think the Congressman
lied in his campaign speech," would receive protection under the
Gertz opinion privilege. Under the Milkovich standard, however,
the statement would be actionable because the assertion that the
Congressman lied is provably false.
Milkovich directly affects indirect defamation analysis. Prior
to Milkovich, courts could often avoid indirect defamation analysis
by classifying statements, under Gertz, as constitutionally pro-
tected opinion. For example, in Price v Viking Penguin, Inc.,1 the
plaintiff charged that a book implied he was guilty of witness tam-
pering,'4 obstructing justice,'9 and investigatory harassment. 0 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendants, ruling that the statements were constitutionally pro-
tected opinion." Milkovich forecloses the Eighth Circuit's analysis;
4 497 US 1 (1990).
11 The Gertz Court held that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 418 US at 339-40.
" Milkovich, 497 US at 20.
47 881 F2d 1426 (8th Cir 1989).
Id at 1438.
,8 Id at 1439.
80 Id at 1445.
81 881 F2d at 1447. See also Saenz v Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 653 F Supp 552, 568 (N
D Ill 1987) (holding that the charge that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
torture going on around him was protected opinion).
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under Milkovich, the statements would not have qualified as pro-
tected opinion because the charges were provably false.52
Milkovich complicates matters by mooting much of the Gertz
analysis and throwing more cases into the arena of indirect defa-
mation. After Milkovich, media defendants now face a more diffi-
cult task in asserting their First Amendment rights. In order to
maintain the desired level of press protection in indirect defama-
tion cases, the courts must use the falsity analysis of Hepps exclu-
sively. The courts may gradually expand the Hepps falsity require-
ment by including part of what was formerly the Gertz opinion
privilege. For example, in Unelko Corp. v Rooney,5 3 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Andy Rooney's assertion that a product "didn't
work" could not be protected as opinion under Milkovich." The
court reasoned, however, that Unelko failed to meet its burden of
proving falsity.55 Without explicitly saying so, the Ninth Circuit
may have endorsed the view that Hepps now encompasses at least
part of what was formerly the Gertz opinion privilege.
C. Indirect Defamation Cases
Several courts have addressed the question of whether plain-
tiffs56 may recover against media defendants for indirect defama-
tion.5 7 The holdings are not consistent. Indirect defamation in-
volves two types of cases: (1) innuendo and implication cases and
(2) omission cases. Courts have proposed a variety of possible stan-
dards for both forms of indirect defamation. The holdings can be
loosely grouped into four categories.
1. No libel by innuendo.
A few states hold that libel cannot arise from innuendo or im-
plication. For example, in Strada v Connecticut Newspapers,
Inc.,58 the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that "[w]hen any in-
ference or innuendo does not arise from the omission of material
as Price either was or was not guilty of witness tampering, obstructing justice, and in-
vestigatory harassment. These are indictable offenses that are provable.
912 F2d 1049 (9th Cir 1990).
, Id at 1053.
Id at 1057.
6 In the analysis that follows, all but three cases involve public figure plaintiffs. Nich-
ols, Adams, and Locricchio involve private plaintiffs and matters of public concern.
67 The cases cited are not exhaustive of all indirect defamation decisions, but they do
represent all significant viewpoints.
58 193 Conn 313, 477 A2d 1005 (1984).
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facts . . . the plaintiff may not recover for libel by innuendo.""9 In
Strada, a state senator alleged that an article describing the "close
relationship" between an attorney he sought to appoint as local
prosecutor and an "important organized crime figure" defamed
him by implication. ° The court, citing the high degree of First
Amendment press protection, refused to recognize the claim. The
story contained no false statements, the court reasoned, and the
"media would be unduly burdened if, in addition to reporting facts
about public officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigi-
lant for any possibly defamatory implication arising from the re-
port of those true facts." 61
De Falco v Anderson" echoed the sentiment of Strada. The
challenged article contained a picture of the plaintiff, a former
congressional aide, prominently displayed in a story about con-
gressmen with mafia ties.6 A New Jersey appellate court affirmed
a directed verdict for the defendant. Because the article contained
no falsehoods or omissions of material facts, the court determined
that "no libel by innuendo of a public figure" could arise.6 4 Fur-
thermore, the court ruled that there could be no defamation by
"the editorial choice of layout. ' 65 Finally, De Falco adopted
Strada's suggestion that omission of material facts could constitute
defamation. 6
Likewise, in Mihalik v Duprey,67 a Massachusetts appellate
court ruled that allowing recovery for defamation by implication
was inconsistent with New York Times .6 In Mihalik, the defend-
ant published a "riddle" in a newsletter with five "clues," each of
which was true. The plaintiff alleged, however, that the compila-
tion, taken as a whole, was defamatory because it implied that the
plaintiff engaged in unethical activity.6 9 The court held that "[iut
" 477 A2d at 1012.
60 Id.
01 Id. See also Schaefer v Lynch, 406 S2d 185 (La 1981), in which the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that New York Times precludes public figures from recovering for defa-
mation by implication but stated in dicta that "truthful statements which carry a defama-
tory implication can be actionable [only] . . . in the case of private citizens and private
affairs." Id at 188.
2 209 NJ Super 99, 506 A2d 1280 (1986).
"' 506 A2d at 1281.
, Id at 1284, quoting Strada, 477 A2d at 1012.
06 Id.
6 See id; Strada, 477 A2d at 1012.
*' 11 Mass App 602, 417 NE2d 1238 (1981).
o6 417 NE2d at 1240-41.
00 The riddle read: "[C]lue 1. Which elected city official does not live within . . . the
ward from which he was elected? [Cllue 2. This person does not have children in the public
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would be incongruous [with New York Times] to permit a public
official to recover where statements (in some degree relevant to his
official conduct) were true as far as they went. ' 70 Thus, similar to
Strada and De Falco, Mihalik established a steadfast rule against
defamation by implication.7'
2. Libel by omission of material facts.
In recent decisions, courts have judged omissions by differing
standards. In Memphis Publishing Co. v Nichols,7 1 an article in
the Memphis Press-Scimitar reported that Ruth Ann Nichols had
been shot and treated for a bullet wound.73 The paper reported
that "the incident took place ...after the suspect arrived at the
Nichols home and found [the suspect's] husband there with Mrs.
Nichols. '74 Nichols, a private figure plaintiff, claimed that by omit-
ting the fact that several other people were present in the house as
well, the article falsely implied that she and the suspect's husband
were engaged in an adulterous relationship. 7 Although every fact
in the article was true, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that
the paper was not entitled to summary judgment.76 The court as-
signed the media a duty of "reasonable care" in reporting the
news77 and ruled that the courts must determine "whether the libel
as published would have a different effect on the mind of the
reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced."7 8
.In Diesen v Hessburg,7 9 a Minnesota appellate court adopted a
modified version of the Nichols analysis. In Diesen, a factually cor-
rect article, taken as a whole, allegedly implied that Diesen, a
county attorney and thus a public official, had committed misfea-
schools. [C]lue 3. He went from provisional city employee to foreman almost overnight.
[C]lue 4. He is having the Trade School make him furniture for his home. [C]lue 5. It's not
the fence watcher. Answer next newsletter, maybe." Id at 1239.
7o Id at 1240.
71 Mihalik may indeed go further and disallow all indirect defamation claims, including
actions for omissions. Although the plaintiff made no claim that material facts were omitted,
Mihalik, unlike Strada and De Falco, did not hold in dicta that material omissions may give
rise to liability.
71 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn 1978).
73 Id at 414.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 569 SW2d at 420.
77 Id at 418.
71 Id at 420, quoting Fleckenstein v Friedman, 266 NY 19, 193 NE 537, 538 (1934).
79 437 NW2d 705 (Minn App 1989).
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sance in his public duties.80 The article charged that Diesen had
failed to prosecute an assault case as a felony. The article omitted
several facts, including that (1) the victim did not wish to go
through with the trial, (2) the victim thought that drug treatment
would be a more appropriate punishment for her assailant, and (3)
Diesen requested a jail sentence for the perpetrator although he
reduced the charges to a misdemeanor. The newspaper's editors
were aware of the omissions prior to publication.8 ' The court held
that indirect defamation of a public figure may arise when "known
facts are omitted, which could have changed the defamatory impli-
cation of the article. '82 Diesen's adoption of a scienter requirement
distinguishes it from Nichols."s While Nichols employs a standard
based completely on the perceptions of a reasonable reader, Diesen
also requires that the defendant knowingly omit facts. The Diesen
scienter requirement severely limits the scope of libel by omission
because the plaintiff must prove knowledge. Nonetheless, as
Diesen itself illustrates, this burden is not impossible to meet.
Dixon v Ogden Newspapers, Inc.84 created an even more strin-
gent test for libel by omission. The plaintiffs were police officers 85
who alleged that the defendant's article implied they had illegally
provided a tavern owner with information about a vice raid. The
article omitted information concerning the timing of the events
which would have shown that the plaintiffs had not committed any
wrongdoing.8 6 The court held that the article was not defamatory
as a matter of law, stating that the New York Times malice re-
quirement can only be satisfied if the plaintiff presents "[e]vidence
that a media defendant intentionally 'avoided' the truth in its in-
vestigatory techniques or omitted facts in order to distort the
truth. ' '87
Dixon adopted three requirements that make its standard
more stringent than the standard espoused in Diesen. Dixon re-
80 Id at 708. The article was admittedly written by a biased newspaper reporter: "In
reading Hessburg's [the reporter's] notes shortly after he left the paper, Dennis Buster, an
editor for the Duluth paper [for which Hessburg wrote], found that Hessburg had lost his
objectivity." Id at 707.
SI Id at 708.
437 NW2d at 709.
Additionally, the plaintiff in Nichols was a private person while the plaintiff in
Diesen was a public figure. It is not clear whether this fact affected the courts' analyses.
8, 187 W Va 120, 416 SE2d 237 (1992).
8S Police officers qualify as public officials. See W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 113 at 806 (West Publishing Co., 5th ed 1984).
" Dixon, 416 SE2d at 240.
07 Id at 244.
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quires the plaintiff prove (1) the omission of material facts leading
to a defamatory implication, (2) knowledge that the material facts
existed, and (3) intentional omission of material facts in order to
distort the truth. In contrast, under Diesen, plaintiffs need only
satisfy the first two conditions. Nichols, meanwhile, requires that a
private figure plaintiff meet only the first requirement.
3. Substantial truth.
A third category of cases allows plaintiffs to recover for indi-
rect defamation by implication or omission only if they negate the
substantial truth of the challenged communication. 8 In Ramada
Inns, Inc. v Dow Jones & Co., 9 a Delaware superior court held
that a plaintiff has an indirect defamation action in both implica-
tion and omission cases only if "a reasonable juror could conclude
that the alleged libel was more damaging in the mind of the aver-
age reader . . . than would have been a precisely truthful re-
port."9 This subjective standard echoes the omission test in Nich-
ols but also includes implications."1
4. Capable of defamatory meaning.
Some courts, including the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in White v Fraternal Order of Police,2 apply a test
more favorable to plaintiffs. In this fourth category, a media de-
fendant is insulated from liability for indirect defamation only
when "the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory
meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory
88 See Pietrafeso v D.P.I., Inc., 757 P2d 1113, 1116 (Colo App 1988) (plaintiff must
show by clear and convincing evidence that challenged statements containing defamatory
implications are not "true, or substantially true").
" 543 A2d 313 (Del Super 1987). Ramada involved newspaper articles reporting on the
financial condition of Ramada's casino operations. The hotel chain claimed that the reports
misrepresented Ramada's financial condition. Id at 316. The court agreed that a reasonable
jury could find that some of the challenged statements were not substantially true.
80 Id at 321.
91 The substantial truth requirement creates an interesting result in cases of "no com-
ment" statements. Ramada held that a newspaper report stating that Ramada failed to
comment about an investigation concerning possible illegal activities was capable of defama-
tory interpretation, ruling that "the 'no comments' are . . . highly susceptible to the inter-
pretation that Ramada was attempting to cover up its problems." Id at 324. Whether
Ramada accurately applied the substantial truth standard it advocated in the "no com-
ment" ruling is questionable. The fact that Ramada failed to comment is the complete truth
of the matter; how the implication of the reported statement could differ from that of a
"precisely truthful statement" is unclear.
9 909 F2d 512 (DC Cir 1990) (applying District of Columbia law).
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sense.""3 This analysis pays no regard to the truth of specific asser-
tions but asks whether the article, taken as a whole, could be un-
derstood as defamatory by a reasonable reader.9 4
This "capable of defamatory meaning" standard may be ap-
plied differently in omissions and implications cases. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has suggested that omissions
may be subject to a stricter review standard than implications."e
The White court observed in dicta that broad liability for omis-
sions would place a heavy burden on the media. The court stated
that "[n]ewspaper reporters should not be required to report the
results of investigative journalism with a precision establishing an
exhaustive, literal picture of what transpired." 6
Similarly, a South Carolina appellate court adopted a stan-
dard for indirect defamation cases that examines whether the de-
fendant's statements are capable of defamatory meaning. In Ad-
ams v Daily Telegraph Printing Co.,9 7 -the court denied summary
judgment to two television stations that broadcast a story stating
that Adams had, among other things, refused to take truth tests
and failed to cooperate with a police murder investigation. Adams
claimed that the reports implied he was guilty of the crime." The
Adams Court ruled that indirect defamation cases will be sent to a
jury unless "the court can affirmatively say that the publication is
incapable of any reasonable construction which will render the
words defamatory."99
Id at 518, quoting Levy v Am Liability Mutual Insurance Co., 196 A2d 475, 476 (DC
App 1964).
"4 White broke with Strada and De Falco by recognizing the relevance of layout and
visual effects, especially when evaluating allegedly defamatory television reports. "[T]he tel-
evision medium offers the publisher the opportunity, through visual presentation, to empha-
size certain segments in ways that cannot be ascertained from a mere reading of the tran-
script." White, 909 F2d at 526, quoting Southern Air Transport, Inc. v Am Broadcasting
Co., 877 F2d 1010, 1015 (DC Cir 1989) (ruling that television broadcast juxtaposing picture
of Southern Air plane with the caption "South Africa Connection" could not reasonably be
interpreted as implying that Southern Air was assisting the South African government in
covert operations).
" White did not rule on the issue of omissions because there were no material facts
omitted in the challenged publications. 909 F2d at 520-21 ("[B]ecause we need not decide
whether omissions are relevant to establishing defamatory meaning in order to dispose of
this case, we leave the delineation of that issue for another day.").
Id at 525.
292 SC 273, 356 SE2d 118 (1986).
356 SE2d at 119-20.
" Id at 122, quoting Flowers v Price, 192 SC 373, 377, 6 SE2d 750, 751 (1940). White is
a public figure case while Adams is a private figure-public interest case. The similarity of
the two standards may demonstrate that the White and Adams courts did not consider the
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In Locricchio v Evening News Association,0 " the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict against the plaintiffs,
owners, and developers of a resort, who claimed that a series of
newspaper articles linked them to organized crime.10' The court
held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of "prov[ing]
falsity and fault by, at minimum, a preponderance of evidence. 1 0 2
The court also stated, however, that an indirect defamation action
may be brought by private plaintiffs in cases involving matters of
public concern if the "statement or implication [is] capable of de-
famatory meaning."'' 13
III. TOWARD A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR INDIRECT DEFAMATION
A. Indirect Defamation Requires a Special Standard
Neither the British and pre-New York Times American ap-
proach nor current constitutional law adequately deals with indi-
rect defamation cases. Indirect defamation is a unique problem de-
manding a unique solution. Holding the media responsible for
"reasonable" implications and "material" omissions may make re-
porting more difficult. Editors must worry about more than the
truth of specific statements. They must guard against numerous
possible interpretations and assure that no material facts are omit-
ted. Ultimately, editors may choose not to publish certain undenia-
bly true facts for fear of possible defamation suits. Thus, a stricter
standard will have a chilling effect on the free flow of information.
Because of such effects, any new standard must be carefully
considered.
Current constitutional law is inadequate for two principal rea-
sons. First, it does not provide enough protection for critical re-
porting. Before Milkovich, most allegedly defamatory reporting
could be characterized as protected opinion. British courts and
pre-New York Times American courts reached similar outcomes.
British courts recognize the privilege of fair comment that protects
public/private figure distinction relevant in defining falsity, at least in cases involving mat-
ters of public concern.
100 438 Mich 84, 476 NW2d 112 (1991).
151 476 NW2d at 114.
152 Id at 133.
Id. The defamatory meaning analysis in Locricchio, however, begs the question of
whether Michigan limits defamation to false statements of fact. A concurring opinion thus
drew a distinction between false implications and true facts presented in a "straightforward
manner": "True facts, whatever their 'implications,' cannot become actionable simply be-
cause they are collected and published together in a straightforward manner." Id at 138
(Cavanagh concurring).
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any opinion expressed on a matter of public concern as long as
"any man, however prejudiced and obstinate, could honestly hold
the view expressed.' 10 4 Pre-New York Times American courts rec-
ognized a similar privilege.'0 5 But because Milkovich makes any
expression with a provably false factual connotation actionable, 10
the constitutionaliZation of libel law may now have the perverse
effect of providing less protection than the fair comment privilege
it replaced. 10 7 This conflicts with the goal of New York Times that
the First Amendment should "secure 'the widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' ,'8
Second, current constitutional law does not adequately explain
the falsity requirement. While Hepps requires the plaintiff to
prove falsity, the Supreme Court did not specify whether this
means the falsity of the specific statements or the falsity of their
reasonable interpretation. If the former, the New York Times-
Hepps-Milkovich analysis is conspicuously silent on the question
of indirect defamation, requiring an expanded explanation. If the
latter, then a common law reasonableness standard applies.
If applicable, a common law reasonableness approach also fails
to provide a desirable standard. First, because defamation is a
common law tort, reasonableness would be determined by state
and local juries. This subjects the national media to the whims of
eccentric localities. New York Times sought to correct this prob-
lem. The malice requirement prevents the chilling effect on free
speech that arises when localities independently determine the
measure of fault required. The spirit of New York Times suggests
that the common law reasonableness standard violates the First
Amendment.
004 Telnikoff v Matusevitch, 4 All ER 817, 824 (House of Lords 1991) (Lord Keith).
100 For example, New Jersey allowed fair comment if the communication met the fol-
lowing conditions: fair comment "(a) must be based on facts truly stated, and (b) must not
contain imputations of corrupt or dishonourable motives on the person whose conduct or
work is criticised, save in so far as such imputations are warranted by the facts, and (c)
must be the honest expression of the writer's real opinion." Leers v Green, 24 NJ 239, 131
A2d 781, 789 (1957).
100 Milkovich, 497 US at 20.
107 For example, Leers involved a charge that a politician misused his office to profit
from a real estate deal. Leers, 131 A2d at 783. Because this statement is provably false, a
court, under the standard established in Milkovich, would find the statements actionable.
Yet Leers held that the statement was protected by fair comment. Ironically, the British
press, without the benefit of a First Amendment, may now receive greater protection against
libel claims than the American media.
108 New York Times, 376 US at 266, quoting Associated Press v United States, 326 US
1, 20 (1945). The goal is to assure wide dissemination of information while sufficiently pro-
tecting the reputational interests of plaintiffs.
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Second, even if a national standard of reasonable interpreta-
tion is possible, problems still remain. Under such a regime, the
media's liability hinges not merely on what it prints but on how
the public is reasonably expected to react. The media thus must
make an ex ante determination of the public's reaction. Plaintiffs
need not prove the absolute falsity of the challenged statements;
they must only demonstrate that a reasonable reader would per-
ceive false implications. This sacrifices the ideals of truth and
wide, antagonistic discussion to popular prejudices, as juries are at
liberty to draw whatever inferences they deem reasonable.109
A third problem with the common law reasonableness ap-
proach is that the defense of fair comment does not solve all of the
problems of indirect defamation. For example, in Lewis v Daily
Telegraph, ° two newspapers published a true statement that the
London Fraud Squad was inquiring into a company's affairs."'
The chairman of the company brought suit claiming that the arti-
cles implied that he was guilty of fraud." 2 The court did not dis-
cuss the fair comment defense."' Applying the reasonable inter-
pretation test, the House of Lords found the articles actionable
despite the truth of the facts expressed. 1 4 This result conflicts
with the goal of wide and antagonistic expression established by
New York Times. The inadequacy of reasonable interpretation
demonstrates the need for a constitutional standard for indirect
defamation.
B. Uniformity of the Proposed Model Standard for Omissions
and Implications
In the interest of consistency, an indirect defamation standard
should be as uniform as possible. While omissions and implications
are different forms of indirect defamation, no separate standard is
required. First, the "substantial truth" and "reasonable interpreta-
tion" theories, as evidenced in Ramada, Adams, and Locricchio,
10' Lewis v Daily Telegraph, 2 All ER 151 (House of Lords 1963), demonstrates this
possibility. Nothing in the reasonable interpretation doctrine prevents a jury from deter-
mining that a report of a criminal investigation implies guilt. Thus, the press is not always
free to report the fact of ongoing investigations.
"' Id at 151 (Lord Reid).
. Id at 154.
112 Id.
"' The allegedly illegal activities of a corporation and its chairman appear to constitute
a matter of public concern. It is therefore logical that the newspapers would have raised a'
fair comment defense.
114 2 All ER at 157.
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can be adapted to both omissions and implications. For example,
an article would be substantially true if it contained no false state-
ments and no material omissions. Likewise, reasonable interpreta-
tion turns on a statement's effect on a reasonable reader. Whether
the defamation is accomplished by omission or implication is
irrelevant.
Second, omissions are a category of implications. Omissions
are not actionable unless the article creates a defamatory implica-
tion. In both implications and omissions cases, the plaintiff alleges
that the media twisted the truth in such a way as to make it de-
famatory. Third, because the line between omissions and implica-
tions tends to blur, courts may find it difficult to determine
whether the defamatory nature of an article arises from its overall
tone or the omission of a particular fact. In such cases, a dual stan-
dard would create confusion.
Despite the similarities between omissions and implications,
some courts recommend separate treatment. First, Nichols,
Diesen, and Dixon presented standards solely applicable to omis-
sions, suggesting that implications merit a distinct analysis. 115 Sec-
ond, Strada, De Falco, and White explicitly argued that omissions
and implications are materially different. Strada and De Falco
held that public figures may not recover for libel by innuendo but
that omissions of material facts may be actionable. " 6 Omissions
are the only types of implications easily remedied by the press. By
thorough investigation, good reporters can assure that they possess
all material facts. Implications, on the other hand, are inherently
subjective. To impose press liability for failing to guard against po-
tential interpretations, Strada and De Falco reasoned, imposes an
"undue burden" on the press." 7
In contrast, dicta in White implied that guarding against de-
famatory omissions is actually more difficult than protecting
against defamatory implications. White found that investigative
reporting is imperfect; requiring the press to know and print all
material facts and to know which omissions would send a defama-
tory message would have a chilling effect on reporting. The press
"' In addition, while Ramada's substantial truth formulation does not distinguish be-
tween omissions and implications, see Ramada, 543 A2d at 317, the court's ruling on state-
ments of "no comment" may indicate special treatment for omissions. Id at 324.
16 Strada, 477 A2d at 1012; De Falco, 506 A2d at 1284.
117 See Strada, 477 A2d at 1012; De Falco, 506 A2d at 1284.
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might avoid printing controversial stories if the failure to uncover
a single material fact could lead to a libel judgment.11 8
C. The Model Standard
This Comment proposes a model standard that is a synthesis
of several of the cases discussed above. The model standard has
two parts: a test for implications and a test for omissions. In the
interest of uniformity, however, the standard attempts to maintain
substantial consistency between the tests. " '
1. Implications.
A good compromise solution for defamation by implication in-
volves a combination of the New York Times and Strada/De Falco
analyses. New York Times requires public figures to prove actual
malice in defamation actions. New York Times defines actual mal-
ice as publication with "knowledge that [the challenged communi-
cation] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."120 Indirect defamation law should take this analysis one
"' See White, 909 F2d at 525. One possible resolution to the problem enunciated in
White is a "hot news" privilege that would protect the press in the case of late breaking
stories. Often, the press has only a short time to prepare for publication of an important
news story, rendering thorough research impossible. A "hot news" privilege would protect
the press from libel actions in these cases. Still, a "hot news" privilege would not solve the
problem acknowledged in White. News organizations do not have the time or resources to
explore every possible angle of every story. Moreover, space considerations will prohibit
publishing every fact uncovered. Because judgments as to which facts are "material" will
constantly be made by reporters and editors, omissions are bound to occur.
119 A national standard should also address the question of standard of review. New
York Times requires proof of actual malice by "convincing clarity." 376 US at 285-86. Sev-
eral courts have extended this requirement to the question of falsity. Viking Penguin re-
jected a defamation suit because the plaintiff failed to "show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that [the defendant] published particular false facts with knowledge of their probable
falsity." 881 F2d at 1445. Likewise, Ramada held that the plaintiff "must present clear and
convincing evidence" to prove falsity or negate substantial truth. 543 A2d at 319. The court
did note that "[t]he quantum of proof with respect to falsity, however, has never been di-
rectly addressed by the Supreme Court." Id. Locricchio differs from Viking Penguin and
Ramada on this point, asserting that a plaintiff must "prove falsity and fault by, at mini-
mum, a preponderance of evidence." 476 NW2d at 133. But the clear and convincing stan-
dard merits more support. Citing the importance of the First Amendment, Ramada inter-
prets New York Times to mean that "an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff would be much
more serious than one for the defendant" in defamation cases. 543 A2d at 319. "The possi-
bility of such error, the [Supreme] Court noted, would 'create a strong impetus toward self-
censorship . . . ' producing the result that legitimate utterances would be deterred." Id,
quoting Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc., 403 US 29, 50 (1971). If the Court errs on the side
of the defendant with respect to actual malice, the same should be true of falsity. Thus,
indirect defamation plaintiffs should have to prove falsity by clear and convincing evidence.
02 New York Times, 376 US at 280.
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step further and require that public figure plaintiffs prove that the
defendant knew that the alleged defamation carried a false impli-
cation. In addition, private persons, who now must only prove fault
(negligence) under Gertz, should have to demonstrate New York
Times malice to recover for indirect defamation. Finally, the model
standard establishes an intermediate requirement for private
plaintiffs in cases involving matters of public concern, balancing
the plaintiff's reputational interest with the need for free flow of
information. Such plaintiffs should demonstrate malice to collect
actual damages and knowledge to collect presumed and punitive
damages.
The model standard's heightened scienter requirement com-
pensates for the difficulty faced by the media in protecting against
defamatory implications. While reporters can verify with relative
ease whether specific statements of fact are true or false, determin-
ing what implications readers will draw from an article is a far
more difficult task. In order to protect the free flow of ideas, the
model standard provides the media more latitude for defamatory
implications than for false statements of fact. Such a requirement
best aligns the model standard with the goals of New. York Times,
which declared that the First Amendment mandates "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.''12 If the media
must constantly fear lawsuits even when it has reported true state-
ments, the quality of reporting will suffer. 22
Once the plaintiff satisfies the enhanced scienter requirement,
the model standard requires the plaintiff to prove that a reasona-
ble reader would interpret the challenged communication as hav-
ing a defamatory implication. As such, the standard rejects the
Adams approach that any language capable of defamatory inter-
121 Id at 270.
Innuendo that arises from ambiguous language may not merit a heightened scienter
requirement. Implication generally refers to cases in which the media reports a set of facts
(call them X) and the reader infers additional facts (Y). Holding the media responsible for
the falsity of Y when X is true could chill reporting where the press lacks knowledge of false
implications. But innuendo often arises from ambiguous statements where the media claims
to have reported X but even an objective reader may not be sure whether the media re-
ported X or X + Y. In such cases, holding the press responsible for the truthfulness of Y
may be necessary to encourage responsible reporting.
In addition, ambiguous statements do not always deserve to be treated as indirect defa-
mation. If a reasonable person would determine that the media reported X + Y, then the
media should be held responsible for the truthfulness of X + Y. Indirect defamation analy-
sis only applies when the implications exceed the plain meaning of the language. These are
the most difficult types of implications for the media to prevent, and thus reporters deserve
a higher level of protection. Ambiguous statements, however, deserve no extra protection.
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pretation may be actionable. Strada and De Falco correctly ob-
served that the Adams approach holds the press to an exceedingly
high standard-perhaps one inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment as interpreted in New York Times. Courts cannot reasonably
conclude that the press has acted with malice every time it fails to
foreclose a possible defamatory interpretation to a news report.
Thus, the plaintiff should have to demonstrate not merely that the
communication was capable of defamatory interpretation but that
a reasonable person would perceive it as such.
Finally, the model standard reads Hepps to require that an
indirect defamation plaintiff negate the substantial truth of the
publication. This requirement parallels falsity analysis in direct
defamation cases and adopts the definition of substantial truth of-
fered by Nichols.23 Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate how the
communication should have been worded. This compromise, while
recognizing the burden indirect defamation places on the press,
would allow recovery in cases in which the media is clearly at fault.
This standard will preserve the free flow of information while
guarding against malicious reputational injury.
2. Omissions.
Omissions require a slightly more precise standard than impli-
cations. The model standard represents a compromise between the
Strada and De Falco position that omissions are more harmful
than implications and the White analysis that omissions are more
difficult for the press to guard against. For public figure plaintiffs,
the model standard adopts the Dixon requirement that such plain-
tiffs must prove that (1) the defendant had knowledge that the
material facts existed, (2) the defendant intentionally omitted ma-
terial facts in order to distort the truth, and (3) the publication
contained an actual defamatory implication.12 4 In suits by private
plaintiffs, plaintiffs, under the model standard, should demon-
strate recklessness as to the existence of material facts and reckless
rather than intentional omission. When the case involves a private
plaintiff and a matter of public concern, the model standard re-
quires that the plaintiff prove (1) recklessness as to existence of
material facts and reckless omission for actual damages, and (2)
knowledge of the existence of material facts and intentional omis-
"M Memphis Publishing Co. v Nichols, 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn 1978). For a discussion of
Nichols, see notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
124 Dixon, 416 SE2d at 244.
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sion for presumed and punitive damages." The Nichols test can
be used to determine whether an omission creates an actual defam-
atory implication.
The proposed model standard creates the best environment to
protect the free flow of information while permitting recovery
against irresponsible reporting. Adopting the Nichols test alone
would be inconsistent with New York Times and Gertz because it
requires no fault by the defendant. Similarly, the Diesen test, al-
though arguably a good compromise, fails to address the problem
of space and time limitations. A newspaper article or television
broadcast cannot report every material fact because time and
space are limited. Diesen would hold editors culpable for every
concession made because of space limitations. Only Dixon ac-
knowledges the realities of reporting by requiring defamatory in-
tent by the media. Thus, only a version of the Dixon test is consis-
tent with the model standard for defamation by implication.
CONCLUSION
Indirect defamation presents a complex problem unresolved
by the courts. The competing interests of freedom of the press, me-
dia responsibility, and the protection of reputations make it diffi-
cult to strike an appropriate balance.
This Comment proposes a model standard that provides a
three-pronged test for implications and a two-pronged test for
omissions. In cases of implications, which include innuendo, public
figure plaintiffs must prove intent to deceive, private plaintiffs
must show actual malice (recklessness), and private plaintiffs in
cases involving matters of public concern must show New York
Times malice to collect actual damages and show intent to deceive
to recover presumed and punitive damages. In addition, the plain-
tiff must prove that a reasonable person would understand the
communication as defamatory. Finally, the plaintiff must negate
the substantial truth of the publication at issue.
For cases involving omissions, public figure plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant had knowledge that material facts ex-
isted and intentionally omitted those facts; private plaintiffs must
show recklessness as to the existence of material facts and reckless
omission; and private plaintiffs in cases involving matters of public
concern must show recklessness as to knowledge, reckless omission
" This is consistent with the reasoning of Gertz and the model standard for defama-
tion by implication.
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to collect actual damages, and knowledge and intentional omission
to collect presumed and punitive damages. Additionally, the plain-
tiff must prove that the publication had an actual defamatory
implication.
In all, this model standard balances the difficulty faced by the
media in avoiding defamatory implications and omissions with
reputational concerns. If applied, the proposed standard should
encourage the free flow of information while promoting responsible
reporting.
